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The Institutionalization of 
Unethical Behavior LaRue T. Hosmer 
ABSTRACT. There is a possibility- that the ethical problems 
that have recently surfaced at General Electric, E. F. Hutton 
and General Dynamics are not simple anomalies, but the 
direct result of corporate pressures on individual managers. 
The author looks at the nature of these pressures, which 
come from the strategic planning systems in use at most 
large corporations, and concludes that the current emphasis 
upon improvements in competitive positioning have led 
many managers to take actions that are directly contrary to 
the moral standards, either explicit or implied, of their 
organizations. 
During the spring and summer of 1985, there were 
several highly visible and, to those of us concerned 
with business ethics, highly disturbing disclosures 
of inappropriate managerial behavior in large com- 
panies. General Electric, a firm with a reputation for 
excellence and one inevitably included on lists of 
"best managed" companies, pleaded guilty to a 
charge of defrauding the government on a missile- 
warhead contract. The defense fraud conviction cost 
the company $2 million in criminal penalties. 1 In a 
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lesser known but equally disturbing case, General 
Electric was fined $100,000 and told to absorb 
$900,000 of overcharges in a civil suit involving a 
satellite contract2 
E. F. Hutton, one of the largest and most re- 
spected of the retail brokerage firms, pleaded guilty 
to a check-overdraft scheme that allegedly defrauded 
approximately 400 smaller banks. The intentional 
overdrafts gave Hutton the interest-free use of up to 
$250 million, and is said to have cost the banks as 
much as $8 million. The company was fined $2.75 
million, and ordered to make restitution to the 
banks. 3 
General Electric and E. F. Hutton were the most 
publicized of the 1985 investigations into fraudulent 
practices, but they were not the only examples that 
could be found. It has even been alleged that G~E. 
and Hutton were selected for prosecution because 
they were well known, and well respected, and 
consequently the cases would be well publicized. 
"G.E. was sacrificed in some sense", John Van 
Naanen of the Sloan School of Management at 
M.LT. is quoted as saying in the Wall Street Journal 
"You could have found the same thing at a dozen 
other companies". 4 
Which are those other companies? Many of them 
are defense contractors. In June, Rep. John Dingle 
of Michigan released a list of firms accused of 
defrauding the government in military purchases. 
The list had been provided by the Pentagon In- 
spector General, and included McDonnell Douglas 
for cost mischarges, Rockwell International for labor 
overcharges, General Dynamics for improper billings 
and cost mischarges, Boeing for labor overcharges 
and product substitutions, United Technologies for 
gratuity payments, subcontractor kickbacks, cost 
mischarges and defective pricing. There is no need to 
detail all of the allegations. It is sufficient to say that 
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all ten of the largest defense contractors faced federal 
criminal investigations during the summer of 1985. 5 
Why has this occurred? This is the interesting 
issue, for those of us concerned with the ethics 
of management, and there have been a number of 
explanations of varying sophistication. Mr. Lester 
Crown, Executive Vice President of General Dy- 
namics, member of the Board of Directors, and 
representative of the family that owns roughly 22% 
of the common stock of that company, blamed the 
situation in his company upon the ineffective 
auditing procedures employed by the Department of 
Defense2 
General Dynamics had been accused of adding 
$63 million of improper overhead expenses, includ- 
ing country club memberships and dog kennel fees, 
to defense contracts during the period 1979 to 1982. 
In explanation, Mr. Crown said, "All these things 
were put in for reimbursement. The D.C.A.A~ 
(Defense Contract Administrative Auditor) looked at 
them, then the contracting officer. They then 
knocked out certain percentages. That is either a 
very efficient or a very lazy way. You end up, with 
the passage of time, throwing more and more in, 
because you know a certain percentage of it comes 
out in the end." 
Mr. Crown felt that the major error made by 
General Dynamics was not pressing for improve- 
ments in the auditing methods of the Pentagon. "Is it 
(the Pentagon auditing procedure) a right way? No, I 
don't think so. It should be more specific about 
individual charges. Perhaps we should have had the 
foresight and ingenuity to say it should have been 
changed." 
Mr. Crown also added the familiar excuse that 
senior executives were unaware of the problem. 
"You aren't talking about ethics. I don't think 
anyone in the corporate office knew how these 
things were being charged. It was done on a local 
basis. The thing got sloppy, but not with any 
thought at the top." Mr. Crown did not explain 
why the internal auditing procedures at General 
Dynamics, nor the external auditing required by law 
and performed by Arthur Anderson and Company, 
had not revealed the problem prior to the Con- 
gressional investigation. 
Another explanation blamed the non-competitive 
nature of the weapons procurement process, and the 
"anything goes" attitude that seemed to permeate 
that process. The New York Times, in an editorial, 
stated: 7 
General Electric is a household word. It's the nation's 
largest maker of electrical appliances. Its management 
techniques are studied worldwide. Its automated factories 
are models of advanced design. Yet this week it pleaded 
guilty to defrauding the Air Force of $800,000 by forging 
workers' time cards on a contract for upgrading the 
warheads on Minuteman missiles. 
What made a superb company stoop to picking the 
public's pocket, and for so petty a gain? 
Seeking the causes of crime outside the criminal may 
not be fashionable, but it's somehow hard to envisage a 
group of G~E. managers deciding out of the blue that it 
was a good day to rob the Air Force. They surely operated 
in a culture of sleaze and borderline morality in which 
such behavior is deemed acceptable 
That's not the culture of General Electric, but it's 
coming more and more to look like the pattern of 
acceptable behavior among certain defense contractors. 
Though G~E. is the nation's sixth-largest defense con- 
tractor, military work counts for only 18 percent of its 
business. 
Despite recent attempts at reform, the Pentagon has 
destroyed competition, preferring sole-source contracts 
in which officials are free to alter and gold-plate weapons 
regardless of cost. The same officials then go to work for 
the contractors they cosset. Through contractor lobbying, 
Congress is made a party to a system greased by vast sums 
of money, in which weapons are procured by favors and 
influence, not by open competition. 
The New York Times did not explain how open 
competition could be made applicable to the design 
of complex weapon systems that require extreme 
technological capability for development, and ex- 
treme asset specificity for manufacture. The New 
York Times also did not explain how, in essence, 
exactly the same pattern of fraudulent exploitation 
appeared at E. F. Hutton, in the retail brokerage 
industry that has no connection to defense and no 
lack of competition. 
E. F. Hutton was paired with General Electric in 
the introduction to this paper to illustrate the 
impartiality of managerial dishonesty. Defrauding of 
customers, workers, suppliers and the public seems 
to occur in both the military and civilian sectors of 
the economy. We do not know the extent of the 
fraudulent practices in the civilian sector, of course, 
for we do not have the benefit of  Congressional and 
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Department of Justice investigations -- except in the 
unusual instance of E. F. Hutton - but let me cite 
some anecdotal evidence. All of us who teach 
managerial ethics at Schools of Business Administra- 
tion are occasionally contacted by former students, 
troubled about particular practices that seem to be 
accepted as ordinary business roufnes within their 
companies. These contacts often seem to be inspired 
by current news stories. Here are summaries of three 
recent contacts, obviously prompted by the publicity 
given to E. F. Hutton: 
1. A prior student, working in data processing 
and operations management at the dividend 
disbursement section of a large bank, said that 
it was common practice not to respond to the 
first inquiry from a company stock-holder 
regarding non-receipt of  a dividend payment. 
Individual investors, particularly older people, 
lose their checks, or they move between 
winter and summer homes, and the Post 
Office may not forward their checks. Non- 
response to the first inquiry permits the bank 
to have use of the funds for 45 to 60 additional 
days, until a second inquiry is sent. 
2. A prior student, working in the purchasing 
department of an automobile manufacturer, 
said that it was common practice to delay 
payments to small parts suppliers beyond the 
normal 30 day terms. Smaller suppliers have 
no effective way of complaining, beyond 
discontinuing the business relationship. It is 
interesting that the E. F. Hutton overdrafts 
were drawn on smaller banks, that again had 
no effective means of rectifying the situation. 
. A prior student, working as a commercial loan 
officer in a large bank, said that while it was 
not a common practice, the bank would 
arrange, as part of  their normal cash manage- 
ment services, to have customer checks drawn 
on accounts at remote locations; this, of  
course, delayed the actual payment of the 
funds, and increased customer bank balances. 
This person also said that customer overdrafts 
on those accounts were "accepted" as a cost of  
business. "E. F. Hutton is only one of many 
companies that has discovered this cheap form 
of financing" was the statement made to me, 
in confidentiality. 
These three practices are, perhaps, not illegal, but 
they do have an adverse impact upon stockholders, 
suppliers and creditors without their consent, and 
consequently there is an ethical element. Why do 
they occur, apparently without examination or 
concern at the companies involved? We have looked 
at two explanations - lack of auditing and lack of 
competition - that seem not to be applicable in the 
present instances. Let us look at a third - benefits to 
the corporation, not to the individual - from the 
Wall Street Journal8 that will serve to introduce the 
major argument of this paper: 
But, rules and lectures are ineffective against an excess 
of loyalty to an employer. Unlike former LTV Corp. 
Chairman Paul Thayer or Tennessee banker Jake 
Butcher, both of whom recently drew prison sentences 
for illegally using their positions to enrich themselves, the 
G£. managers who have violated taws did so to bolster 
the company's fortunes, not their own. 
The argument that unethical behavior is a conse- 
quence of an "excess of loyalty to an employer" and a 
desire to further the employer's interests, not the 
individual's, even at the expense of stockholders, 
suppliers, employees and creditors, in my opinion 
totally misconstrues the position in which many, if 
not most, middle level managers are placed today. 
There are personal benefits to unethical behavior in 
middle management. These personal benefits come 
from very specific provisions in the organizational 
structure and managerial processes currently used by 
large firms. Let us look at these "structural" causes of 
unethical behavior. 
Most large companies, today, are diversified. In a 
landmark research project on corporate strategy (the 
first to use large scale data to relate economic per- 
formance to corporate strategy and organizational 
structure), Richard Rumelt of U.C.LA. 9 found that 
by 1969, 93% of America's 1000 largest firms were 
diversified (operating in more than one industry). 
Subsequent studies have shown that the 93% figure 
has increased2 ° In the major finding of his work, 
Prof. Rumelt confirmed the earlier historical analysis 
of Alfred Chandler 11 that a divisionalized structure 
followed a diversified strategy, and he demonstrated 
that this strategy-structure sequence was related to 
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the improved economic performance of firms within 
his sample. 
The divisionalized structure, of course, divides a 
company into a series of product divisions, each of 
which is responsible for the financial performance of 
a given product or product line. A divisionalized 
structure of this type, at the date of the Rumelt 
study, was generally decentralized: authority for 
product, market and process changes was allocated 
to the divisional management who were also held 
responsible for economic performance. 
There are two major problems with the divi- 
sionalized, decentralized type of organizational 
structure. 12 Firstly, interrelationships between the 
divisions - in products, markets, processes or 
technologies - cannot be utilized as the basis for 
economies of scale or economies of scope due to 
the separate nature of the divisions. For example, 
three divisions all using fractional horsepower 
motors in their product designs, or all using 
industrial wholesalers for their distribution channels, 
have no incentive in a decentralized structure to 
combine their activities. And, corporate manage- 
ment in the decentralized structure had no control 
over the divisional strategies until after an out- 
standing success or absolute failure had occurred. 
Changes in the management of diversification were 
needed. 
General Electric led in the development of new 
methods for the management of diversity. G~E., 
of course, is almost the archetype of a diversified 
firm, with numerous products, multiple markets and 
various processes, and in the early 1970s it was 
organized in a decentralized structure, with approxi- 
mately 250 product divisions grouped by industry 
type and evaluated by financial performance. Cor- 
porate executiyes, however, were concerned that 
despite substantial sales increases and continual 
technical developments, profits remained almost 
constant in absolute terms, and actually declined as a 
percentage of sales. The corporate-level executives 
were also dismayed by their inability to influence the 
strategy of the product division competing in the 
mainframe computer market, which eventually 
resulted in a write-off of nearly $300 million in 
developmental expenses and facility investments. It 
was felt that a new method of strategic planning was 
needed, to combine related divisions and to control 
divisional strategies. 
The strategic planning method developed by 
General Electric was termed a portfolio model since 
it evaluated each product-market-process unit in 
the company as an investment that could be in- 
creased, maintained, or decreased over time, similar 
to the portfolio or assortment of investments in 
stocks and bonds held by a mutual fund. 13 The 
product-market-process units at General Electric 
were termed "strategic business units", or "SBUs"; 
they consisted of related product divisions that had 
an ability to act independently in an industry with 
known competitors through a clearly defined 
strategy. Because each SBU combined related divi- 
sions, functional executives within an SBU could 
achieve economies of scale and economies of scope 
through cooperative actions. Because each SBU 
acted independently within an industry (that is, 
without the need for relying upon input materials or 
output sales from other sections of the company), 
senior executives within the firm could hold the 
managers and staff of an SBU solely responsible for 
short-term performance. Because each SBU was 
dependent upon the corporation for finance, senior 
executives could review and direct the long-term 
strategy of an SBU through resource allocation, 
using a corporate planning model rather than a 
capital budgeting process. The 250 decentralized 
product divisions at General Electric became 73 
semi-centralized strategic business units. 
The central concept of the semi-centralized 
corporate planning model developed by General 
Electric was that each strategic business unit differed 
on two basic dimensions: the attractiveness of the 
industry, and the strength of the company within 
that industry. It was felt that each strategic business 
unit could be measured on those two dimensions, 
and then compared. As a result of the comparison, 
corporate resources could be channeled to the 
divisions that combined industry attractiveness and 
company strengths because these were felt to be the 
divisions with the greatest probability of competitive 
success and increased profitability. 
The attractiveness of the industry was measured 
on a multiple factor scale that included such inputs 
as the overall size of the market, annual growth, 
historical profitability, competitive intensity, etc. See 
Figure 1 for a listing of the factors, and an example 
of the measurement process. The factors were 
weighted (by percentage) and then the business unit 
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Inflationary vulnerability 0.05 
Energy requirements 0.05 
Environmental impact 0.05 
Social/political/legal Must be 
acceptable 
1.00 
0.20 4.00 0.80 
0.20 5.00 1.00 
0.15 4.00 0.60 






Weight Measurement Value 
Market share 0.10 2.00 0.20 
Share growth 0.15 4.00 0.60 
Product quality 0.10 4.00 0.40 
Brand reputation 0.10 5.00 0.50 
Distribution network 0.05 3.00 0.15 
Promotional effectiveness 0.05 2.00 0.10 
Productive capacity 0.05 3.00 0.15 
Productive efficiency 0.05 2.00 0.10 
Unit costs 0.15 3.00 0.45 
Material supplies 0.05 5.00 0.25 
R&D performance 0.10 4.00 0.80 
Managerial personnel 0.05 4.00 0.20 
1.00 3.90 
Company strength within the industry 

















Fig. 1. Factors, weights and measures for the General 
Electric planning matrix. 
Source: LaRue Hosmer, Strategic Management: Text and Cases on 
Business Policy, Prentice Hall, 1982, pp. 311-12. 
was measured (on a comparative rather than absolute 
scale of 1 to 5) for each factor to obtain an 
approximate value that could be summarized, and 
used to evaluate the competitive posture of the SBU. 
The strength of the business unit within the 
industry was also measured on a multiple factor scale 
that included such elements as market share, share 
growth, product quality, brand reputation, etc. 
Again, these factors were weighted and the business 
unit measured along cardinal scales to obtain a 
summary figure. 
Owing to the subjective nature of the weights that 
were applied to each of the factors, and to the 
inexact method of measurements along comparative 
rather than absolute scales, the summary figures for 
the attractiveness of the industry and the strength 
of the company within that industry were not used 
directly to evaluate each business unit. That is, a 
strategic business unit that measured 3.45 x 3.90, as 
in the example in Figure 1, was not automatically 
considered to be "better", or more likely to receive 
funding for further growth, than one that measured 
3.35 x 3.80, or even 3.45 x 4.00. Instead, all strategic 
business units were grouped along each dimension, 
with one-third above average, one-third average, and 
one-third below average, arid then they were visually 
displayed on a simple nine-cell matrix, again illus- 
trated in Figure 1. 
Business units that were above average on one of 
the dimensions of the General Electric planning 
model, and at least average on the other dimension, 
were considered to be optimal candidates for cor- 
porate investment, and accelerated growth. Business 
units that were below average on one of the 
dimensions, and no better than average on the other, 
were felt to be prime candidates for disinvestment, 
and eventual sale or liquidation. The balance of the 
business units were destined to be maintained at 
approximately the existing sales level and capital 
supply until either the industry's attractiveness or the 
company's strength within that industry changed, 
leading then to increased investment and growth, or 
to gradual devestment, and sale. 
The planning model proposed by the Boston 
Consulting Group, though considerably better 
known due to "catchy" phrases and an active pro- 
motional campaign, is in reality an offshoot of the 
one developed by the General Electric Company) 4 
The B.C.G. model, shown in Figure 2, avoids the 









Stars, with high cash 
generation and high 
investment needs 
Cows, with high cash 
generation but low 
investment needs 
Problems, with low cash 
generation but high 
investment needs 
Dogs, with low cash 
generation and low 
investment needs 
0.0 I I I I I 
4.00 2.00 1.00 0.50 0.25 
Market share relative to the largest competitor 
Fig. 2. Market share and market growth relationships for 
the Boston Consulting Group planning matrix. 
Source: LaRue Hosmer, Strategic Management: Text and Cases on 
BusinessPolic),, Prentice Hall, 1982, p. 312. 
problems of subjective weighting and comparative 
measures by assuming that a single statistic can serve 
as the surrogate for industry attractiveness, and that 
another single statistic can serve as the surrogate for 
the divisional strengths within the industry. 
The Boston Consulting Group believes that the 
growth rate of the market, in percentage terms, can 
be used as a summary figure for the attractiveness 
of the industry, since high growth rates tend to 
be associated with high gross margins and low 
competitive pressures. High growth rates generally 
occur in the early stages of the product life cycle, 
before intensive competition affects industry prices, 
margins and profits. The Boston Consulting Group 
also believes that the share of the market, again 
expressed in percentage terms, can be used as a 
summary figure for the competitive position of the 
company within the industry because high market 
share tends to be associated with low production and 
distribution costs. The relationship between high 
market share and low competitive cost in the B.C.G. 
model is felt to be partially the result of the 
economies of scale that bring a constant decrease in 
average unit costs with each increase in annual 
production volume, but it is thought primarily to be 
the result of the experience curve that brings a 
continual decrease in average unit costs with each 
doubling of the cumulative production volume. The 
relationship between market share and market 
growth is generally portrayed in the B.C.G. model on 
a 4-cell matrix, with the familiar "star", "cash cow", 
"problem child" and "dog" categories. 
What do "star", "cash cow", "problem child" and 
"dog" categories, or for that matter, "above average", 
"average" and "below average" rankings have to 
do with unethical managerial behavior? They are 
determinant, given the uses of the strategic planning 
models by senior management. Think for a minute 
of the possibility of your business unit being ranked 
below average on either industry attractiveness or 
company strength; what will happen to that unit? 
Lack of investment, and a "wait and see" attitude on 
the part of corporate management is the best you 
can expect;, disinvestment, and eventual sale or 
dissolution, is the most likely outcome. What will 
happen if your business unit is positioned in the dog 
category? Your unit will be, if we continue to use 
the BCG barnyard lexicon, "harvested", generally 
through sale of the unit or dissolution of the assets. 
Is it propitious to a person's career to be "har- 
vested"? There is little empirical data here, but there 
is substantial anecdotal evidence, all of which seems 
to indicate that the sale or dissolution of a business 
unit often brings personal trauma as executive teams 
are broken up, and a very real chance of dismissal in 
the subsequent cost cutting efforts. Is 
Is it possible to avoid the "below average" rank- 
ings or the "cash cow" and "dog" categories? Yes, 
simply by maintaining quarterly profits as a return 
on investment at a "satisfactory" level. In the General 
Electric planning matrix, profitability has a direct 
influence on the measurement of industry attractive- 
ness through the input factors of historical margins 
and competitive intensity, accounting for 30% of the 
weightings. Profitability has an indirect influence on 
the measurement of company strengths through the 
input factors of product quality, brand reputation, 
promotional effectiveness and production efficiency, 
accounting for 35% of the weightings. The influence 
on company strengths is indirect because high 
profits are felt to be an indication, not a direct 
measure, of high product quality, good brand 
recognition, etc. 
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In the B.C.G. planning matrix, high profits are 
assumed to be the result of high market share and 
high market growth. Consequently, the markets 
served by a given strategic business unit are further 
segmented and redefined until the profit, growth 
and share figures are consistent. This is not as 
unprofessional as it may seem; the need for con- 
sistency forces detailed examination of market 
segments and growth rates, and provides a better 
understanding of the competitive position of a firm. 
For example, Mercedes-Benz has a very small share 
of the slow growing total automobile market in the 
U.S.; a higher share of the more rapidly growing 
import automobile market; and the highest share of 
the most rapidly growing luxury automobile market 
both in the U.S. and worldwide. 
Can the managers within a strategic business unit 
alter the recorded profit of that unit, and conse- 
quently the posifon of that unit on the planning 
matrix? Yes, it is all too easy over the short-term. In 
the non-competitive defense industry, it is possible 
to change labor charges from a fixed-price to a 
negotiated-price portion of the contract, as was done 
by General Electric. Or, it is possible to switch wages 
from indirect to direct labor so that higher overhead 
rates may be allocated, as was done at McDonnell 
Douglas. Or, it is possible to simply add more 
overhead items, as was done at General Dynamics. 
In the competitive brokerage, automotive supply 
and commercial banking industries, it is possible 
to change the amount of capital employed by a 
strategic business unit. Most companies now charge 
for both working capital and fixed capital, and those 
charges constitute a major expense item. By reducing 
the amount of capital recorded against a business 
unit, it is possible to improve both the numerator 
and the denominator of the return on investment 
ratio. (ROI - profits/capital employed) The branch 
offices at E. F. Hutton, the dividend disbursement 
unit of the bank, the assembly division of an 
automobile company and the customers of the cash 
management service all were reducing the amount 
of capital charged to their organizational units, and 
improving their return on investment ratios. 
What can be done to prevent these practices? 
They may or may not be illegal, but the ones we 
have discusssed in the competitive industries do 
harm the smaller banks, the smaller stockholders, the 
smaller suppliers. No office manager at E. F. Hutton 
attempted a deliberate overdraft against Citicorp, 
and I think it safe to assume that no dividend 
disbursement officer has ignored the first inquiry 
from Morgan Stanley or Goldman Sachs. Lastly, my 
informant from the automobile industry admits that 
large suppliers are paid promptly. The Pentagon, of 
course, is not small, but apparently many defense 
contractors felt that the weapons procurement 
process was too complex and cumbersome for 
effective control of labor and overhead billings, and 
so provided an opportunity for exploitation. 
What can be done? General Electric Company has 
taken three publicized actions since the conviction? 6 
They have strengthened the policy manual to ensure 
that strict accounting procedures are followed in 
government contracts. They have appointed an 
ombudsman authorized to investigate any allegations 
of wrongdoing within the company. They have 
issued a series of statements stressing that unethical 
behavior will not be tolerated. The Chairman of 
General Electric, John Welch, spoke out clearly on 
"abuses of integrity" in a story from the Wall Street 
Journal: 17 
Lest anyone doubt the seriousness of GJi.'s intent, Mr. 
Welch issued a stern warning in a videotape being shown 
to employees. Pressure to meet corporate goals won't 
excuse misbehavior, he says, adding that such pressures 
are intensifying as G~E. battles competitors around the 
globe. He also urges employees to come forward with 
their suspicions of wrongdoing. 'Whistle blowing, speak- 
ing out, telling it like it is, is part of what we're after', he 
says. 'I can assure anybody who wants to talk about abuses 
of integrity in this company that they will be welcomed'. 
Will these actions be effective? In the article from the 
Wall Street Journal, 18 it was stated that, "Workers 
at the Philadelphia missile-warhead plant where 
the fraud occurred confirm that Gki. is tightening 
accounting procedures and checking time-card 
charges to prevent falsifications. But they stress that 
plant employees were fully aware of correct proce- 
dures long before the fraud occurred." 
The appeal for "whistleblowers" may be no more 
effective than the tightening of accounting proce- 
dures. All of the managers within an SBU are affected 
by the rankings of their unit. Most of the managers 
probably were not aware of the exact methods used 
to improve those ranldngs at G~E. and E. F. Hutton, 
and few of the managers actually participated in 
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those schemes, but most probably were grateful. An 
"us against them" attitude has developed in the 
strategic business units at most corporations - the 
operating people being pushed for performance 
improvements against the senior executives and 
corporate staff doing the pushing - and I assume 
that the loyalties of the business unit people are 
reasonably well established. Gratitude and loyalty are 
powerful forces to add to the normal reluctance to 
inform on others. 
What is needed to eliminate the structural forces 
that push managers towards unethical decisions and 
actions? I have two suggestions. The first is to 
emphasize analytical rather than strategic planning. 
Planning, control and motivation are related - see 
Figure 3.19 Divisional strategic planning that is based 
upon an analysis of the competitive conditions of the 
industry, the specific strengths and weaknesses of the 
firm, and the anticipated trends in the economy can 
be translated into more accurate resource allocations 
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Fig. 3. Relationship of  planning,  control  and motivat ional  
systems in  corporate management .  
Source: LaRue Hosmer,  Strategic Management: Text and Cases on 
Business PoIic 7, Prentice Hall, 1982, p. 566. 
achievement targets in the budgetary planning 
process. Strategic planning that avoids the company, 
industry and economy appraisal in favor of establish- 
ing arbitrary financial goals, following the directives 
of the senior executives, can lead to inappropriate 
resource allocations, unachieveable performance 
standards, and the temptation to cheat. Listen to 
this statement that describes directive rather than 
analytical strategic planning from a very recent issue 
of Business Week: 2° 
Then Begel (Thomas Begel, Chief Executive Officer of 
the Pullman Company, which has just acquired Peabody 
International, a manufacturer of road graders, dump 
trucks and other construction equipment) can start 
improving Peabody. He wants margins to reach 5% after 
taxes, matching Pullman's. He also wants a return on 
equity of over 15% - quite a change from the 2% Peabody 
posted in the first half of fiscal 1985. First, though, Begel 
intends to "take a hard look at everything" Peabody has. 
"If there are any losers in there, they're going to become 
winners, or they're going to be consigned to oblivion", 
predicts Prezelski (Frank Prezelski, financial analyst at 
Shearson Lehman Brothers, the analyst assigned to the 
Pullman Company, who presumably made this statement 
after meeting with senior executives). 
What are the "losers" at Peabody going to do? They 
compete with low margin products in slow growth 
markets against well established firms, both domestic 
and foreign. In any portfolio planning model, they 
would find themselves in the "below average" 
ranking or "dog" category. There are few legitimate 
means of increasing the return on equity quickly, 
given that competitive position. There are, however, 
numerous means of raising the return on equity that 
may or may not be what Thomas Begel and Frank 
Prezelski expect, and what suppliers, banks, em- 
ployees and customers consider to be "fair". 
My other suggestion, and this is certainly related 
to the need for more analytical and less directive 
strategic planning, is to change the corporate 
management style. The corporate management style 
at many if not most large companies today is to 
push: to push for greater revenues, higher profits, 
larger returns. No one says "and we don't care how 
you get them", but was that statement not previously 
implied at General Electric and E. F. Hutton, and is 
that statement not now implied at Peabody Inter- 
national? 
It is very instructive that the problems at General 
Electric have occurred under the current C~E.O., 
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John Welch, not with the prior C~E.O., Reginald 
Jones. Mr. Welch led the 1984 listing in Fortune's 
"The Toughest Bosses in American. 21 He is known, 
according to that article in Fortune, as "Neutron 
Jack", referring to the alleged capability of  a neutron 
bomb to save the buildings but get rid of  the people. 
Mr. Jones, on the other hand, leads the individuals 
described in the new book by Harry Levinson and 
Stuart Rosenthal, CE.O.: Corporate Leadership in 
Action. 22 Here are two personal quotations, one from 
each source (Welch, 23 Jones 2~) that are very indica- 
tive of  the management style of  each individual: 
The role for the mediocre is clearly short-lived. 
G~E. has a unique culture. It's a family. We enjoy each 
other. We don't lose many in the family of G.E. people. 
We're so supportive of each other we try desperately to 
save an individual who has failed, by placing him in a job 
that better matches his capacities, in order that the 
individual can make a contribution to the organization. 
We save many people. There is a renaissance of these 
people in many instances. 
There is a need for a corporate management style 
that pulis people to meet future competitive condi- 
tions by defining a common objective rather than 
pushes them to meet current financial projections by 
installing a comparative planning system. This 
management style is termed "leadership", and it sets 
the moral standards for the organization by focusing 
on the integrity of  common purpose. Let me close 
with two quotations on leadership and morality that 
I truly like, from Philip Selznick 2s and Chester 
Barnard: 26 
Leadership is more than the ability to mobilize personal 
support; it is more than the maintenance of equilibrium 
through routine solution of day-to-day problems. 
Leadership is~ the ability to define the ends of group 
existence, to design an enterprise distinctly adapted to 
those ends, and to see that the design becomes a reality. 
Leadership in organizations is the power of individuals to 
inspire cooperative personal decisions by creating faith in 
common understanding, faith in the probability of 
success, faith in the ultimate satisfaction of personal 
motives, faith in the integrity of common purpose. 
Leadership is the moral factor in organizations; it creates 
the moral code for the organization. 
Both Philip Selznick and Chester Barnard are saying 
clearly - though Chester Barnard says this with 
characteristically greater precision and elegance - is 
that common objectives create the values of  the firm. 
This is a lesson that appears to have been lost in the 
current methodology of  strategic planning. 
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